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The Legal Status of the
Psychologist in the Courtroom
by Michael L. Perlin

n the practice
law, just
in the
of other
professions
or of
trades,
it is as
often
thepractice
mores and
customs which deserve the attention usually paid to the
written rules of substance and procedure. Although
thousands of words are written about the subtle
points of a significant court decision or statutory revision, usually limited analysis is given to what can be
termed the "socialization of the law."
A discussion of the legal status of the psychologist
in the courtroom should begin with the premise that
the phrase legal status encompasses at least three issues: the legal status of the psychologist as defined by
case law (i.e., when he or she can give expert testimony); the legal roles which a psychologist can fill
(i.e., the kinds of cases in which he or she can testify); and the social status of the psychologist in the
courtroom (i.e., how he or she is viewed by the
judge, the jury, the parties, other experts and other
psychologists themselves). Although case law is now
becoming relatively uniform and the scope of witness
roles is widening, it is the social status of psychologists in the courtroom - a question largely ignored which is probably the most important of these three
topics. I
Jenkins Establishes Legal Status of Psychologists
Although a few early cases held that a properly
qualified psychologist could testify in a criminal trial
on questions involving mental condition or competency to stand trial 2 or in accident disability cases on
3
questions of extent of neurological impairment it
was not until the 1962 decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Jenkins v. United States4
that the psychologist's legal status was given firm
grounding.
In Jenkins, a criminal case in which the defendant
on trial for housebreaking with intent to assault raised
the insanity defense, the trial judge had ordered the
jury to disregard the testimony of defense psychologists that the defendant "had a mental disease" when
he committed the crimes in question because "'a psychologist is not competent to give a medical opinion
as to a mental disease or defect." ' Following the
jury's conviction, however, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial based
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on a series of errors, including that the ruling by the
trial judge was incorrect, since "some psychologists
are qualified to render
expert testimony in the field of
' 6
mental disorder.
Judge David L. Bazelon, speaking for a sharply divided court, noted that the appropriate test was
"whether the opinion offered will be likely to aid the
trier in the search for truth."17 The answer to this test
will not "depend upon [the witness'] claim to the title
'psychologist,' "8 the court warned. Rather, the determination must depend "upon the nature and extent
of his knowledge." 9 While psychologists otherwise
employed in areas such as personnel administration
or industrial relations might not qualify to testify as to
"mental disease or defect," a psychologist with a
doctorate in clinical psychology who has had a psychiatric hospital internship and/or completed an
American Psychological Association-approved
graduate training program and/or is board certified
might properly testify. 10
As indicated, the opinion was not unanimous. In a
special concurring opinion, Judge (now Chief Justice)
Warren Burger criticized Judge Bazelon's opinion for
its alleged "[failure] to give adequate guidance as to
the scope and nature of the inquiry" on remand. 1' He
listed seven major areas of concern, such as the
scope of the specific psychologist's clinical education in "physiological and medical subjects," his ability to "[prescribe] or [supervise] treatment of mental
patients," and the meaning of "clinical experience,' 1 2 which should be covered.' 3 Two other
judges also dissented, urging the court to accept the
position of amicus curiae American Psychiatric Association, which had argued that psychologists should
not be allowed to qualify as experts. 14 According to
the dissenters, the majority should have listened to
the "wise counsel from the only undisputed experts
now at work in the area of medical illness of the
mind."1
Following Jenkins - a case which, by the way,
met with nearly unanimous critical endorsement in
the scholarly legal journals16 - virtually every major
criminal decision has echoed its language, 1 7 thus
strengthening the psychologist's "legal status." Although at least one state's highest court has suggested
that a psychologist is "professionally inferior" to
medical doctors, 18 recent decisions have approved of
the reasoning of the Jenkins court. Some decisions
have allowed the admission of testimony where the
witness's "training, experience, information and personal observation" of the defendant 19 satisfied the

"nature and extent of his knowledge," a test
suggested by Judge Bazelon in Jenkins,2 0 while others
have denied its admissibility in cases where, for
example, the erstwhile witness was a "psychology
technician" with a bachelor's degree and less than a
year's work experience. 2' The language of a Wisconsin court on this point is pertinent:
[Ihf a person has qualifications in a field, he may
testify within his area of competency. As the
frontiers of knowledge are pushed back, we find
it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize
many areas of knowledge with exclusiveness. It
is the particular qualifications of the witness in
relation to the particular issue which should conthan the label of a profession or
trol rather
22
trade.
The language in cases of this sort is not merely hortatory. In Illinois, for instance, courts have been meticulous in examining and evaluating the specific credentials of witnesses sought to be produced in a
series of cases2 3 in accordance with the Jenkins
guidelines.
Doors Opened to Admission
of Psychological Testimony
In addition to extending psychological testimony
beyond the scope of criminal responsibility issues to
encompass cases involving issues such as incompetency to stand trial,2 4 the Jenkins line has significantly expanded psychologists' role in the courtroom
in negligence/automobile accident cases that involve
accuracy of personality tests2 5 and presence of organic brain disease. 26 In a Pennsylvania case involving organic brain damage, 27 after citing Jenkins with
approval,2" the court went one step further and,
based on the testimony of a consulting neurosurgeon
in the case and what it characterized as "present
medical and psychological practice," 29 found that testimony of "non-medical practitioners may be not only
desirable but necessary. "30
But this trend is not unanimous. Maryland recently
rejected another attempt to liberalize its rules on admissibility, choosing instead to limit psychological
testimony to interpretations of psychological tests
(e.g., WAIS, Rorschach, Bender-Gestalt) and to exas to causes of psychological declude testimony
3
ficiencies. '
Jenkins and its progeny, then, literally opened the
doors to the admission of psychological testimony in
many legal areas. Psychologists now commonly testify as expert witnesses in civil commitment matters
involving questions of retardation, acceptability of
treatment involving behavior therapy and appropriateness of placements. 32 They are also increasingly
involved in such issues as employment discrimination,3 3 juvenile placements, 3 4 accuracy in evaluation
of eyewitness testimony,3 5 special education assign37
ments,3 6 effects of bilingualism on children, post8
sentencing disposition, extent of neurological injury,3 9 community standards in obscenity prosecutions, 40 trademark infringements and fraudulent

advertising suits. 4' Even more importantly, perhaps,
psychologists are beginning to testify in class actions
involving such fundamental issues as right to education,42 right to habilitation, 4' and right to vote. 44 Such
testimony continually expands the legal influence of
psychologists. According to psychologist Cameron
Fincher, if the psychological community wishes to
evince a "consistent concern with the social, cultural
and humanistic issues as well as the professional and
technical problems, ' 45 then it must critically involve
itself in these roles.
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of the
use of psychological testimony is the now-famous
Pennhurst case. 46 There, psychologists testified on a
full range of issues before the court, including education, training, care, *habilitation, staffing, restraints,
psychopharmacological problems, abuse, and availability of alternative facilities. 47 This testimony was
crucial in shaping the court's ground-breaking opinion
that the equal protection clause of the Constitution
"prohibit[ed] the segregation of the retarded in an isolated institution such as Pennhurst where habilitation
does. not measure up to minimally adequate standards, ' 48 and "immediate steps [must] be taken' to
49
remove the retarded residents from Pennhurst"
commensurate with the exercise of "great caution
and care." 50 Involvement in this sort of case is telling
evidence of the sort of "social, cultural and humanistic [concern]" 5' referred to and urged by Dr.
Fincher.
At the same time, however, the pertinency of the
simple truism, suggested in an article on courtroom
psychiatry by attorney Bernard Diamond and psychiatrist David Louisell, that "the psychological sciences differ from the biological sciences in that the
subject matter of the former is not visible ' 52 is even
more applicable to a discussion of forensic psychology and the role of the courtroom psychologist. What
are often viewed as the "excesses" of flamboyant
expert witnesses in public spectacles such as the
Hearst or Ruby trials5 3 quickly become transformed
into sins visited upon all expert witnesses. Papers are
regularly published denying the need for involvement
of "adversarial" experts in the legal adversary process,5 4 direly forecasting the inevitable prostitution of
the profession,55 questioning the compatability of
psychology, psychiatry and the courts, 56 and recommending that experts only become involved on an
amicus (friend of the court) or so-called impartial
witnesses level. 57 Although these positions have been
more than adequately responded to by lawyers 58 and
psychiatrists,5 9 a backlash phenomenon is clearly
present.60
Psychologists Viewed as "Second-Class Experts"

Beyond this, however, lurks an even more disturbing problem for forensic psychologists. Not only must
they contend with the same basic antipathy in the
courtroom facing psychiatrists, 6' they must also contend with what is perceived as a "second-class expert" status when compared by judge or jury to medMDLR/MAY-JUNE 1980

195

ical experts. Thus, a basic legal text points out that
"a favorite trick of cross-examination is to bring out
the lack of medical education of the clinical psychologist . . in a voice oozing [with] incredulity or sarcasm." 6 2 Elsewhere, it has been pointed out that
psychologists may sometimes be effectively baited by
attorneys "indirectlly] attempt[ing] to question [their]
qualifications and competence . . by addressing

[them] always as 'Mister.' in marked contrast to the
consistent and appropriate use of the title 'Doctor." "I One of the post-Jenkins decisions notes, for
example, that the trial court had asked the
psychologist-witness. "You have never dissected a
cadaver, have you'?64 In another more recent case,
in an attempt to discredit a clinical psychologist who
had testified as a defense witness, the prosecutor ap-

Study shows psychologists' testimony is "first rate"
The following is excerpted from a paper delivered at the 1979 American Psychology-Law Soci-

ety meeting by clinical psychologists Dr. Norman
G. Poythress, Jr., and Dr. Russell Petrella. Both
work for the Center for Forensic Psychiatry in Ann
Arbo4), Michigan, which handles forensic referrals
from the district and circuit courts throughout the
state regarding issues of competency to stand trial
and criminal responsibility. Its staff includes psychiatrists, social workers and psychologists.
Though the nonmedical mental health professionals are gaining parity with psychiatrists in
terms of their legal status (i.e., admissibility to testify as "experts"), Michael Perlin points out that
nonpsychiatric experts may suffer from decreased
social status in the eyes of the judge or jury

-

they may be perceived as "second-rate" experts.
Psychiatrists may be presumed, .based on the fact
of medical training or on other untested assumptions, to do more thorough or higher quality work
than nonmedical examiners. While reasoned arguments have asserted that none of the mental health
professions has foiensic expertise not shared by
the others, to our knowledge there have been no
empirical studies to date comparing the various
disciplines in terms of the quality 'of forensic
eviluations.
The results of our three studies address the issue
of the thoroughness and quality of forensic examinations performed by medical versus nonmedical
mental health examiners and the issue of whether
the trier of fact perceives the psychologist as a
"sec0ond-rate" expert.
In the first study, we randomly selected clinical
evaluations of defendants referred for competency
to stand trial or criminal responsibility which. had
been completed between August, 1975, and September, 1978. These reports, done by psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, *were
scrutinized regarding the thoroughness of the
evaluation as measured by the amount of effort
and information reflected in the casebook.
Since a longer report is not necessarily a higher
quality report, we undertook a second study to address the issue of the quality of work performed by
196
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the various mental health disciplines. A "blind"
sample of the reports from the first study were
rated and ranked on qualitative factors by various
legal professionals

--

a circuit court judge, a pro-

secuting attorney and a law school professor.
In the third
we utilized records of court
appearance
andstudy,
testimony maintained at the Forensic Center and looked at the outcome of those
cases in which the defendant asserted the insanity
defense. In these cases, the testimony of a Forensic Center psychologist was matched against an
*expert or battery of experts that included medical
or psychiatric personnel.
The purpose of the three-study investigation was
-to test the assumption that the psychiatrists do
more thorough or higher quality work. The results
obtained demonstrate quite convincingly that this
is a false assumption. There is no evidence to
suggest that psychiatrists do higher quality work
on any of the variables employed. To the contrary,
psychiatrists' reports were consistently found to be
shorter than those prepared by psychologists and
social workers. Also the quality of the psychologists' and social workers' reports were consistently
rated as equal to or better than the psychiatrists'
reports. Thus, the psychologist and social worker
status
as "second rate'" experts is unfounded when
one evaluates
the actual work they produce.
This 'study firmly supports the current trend to
utilize nonmedical mental health professionals for
court related evaliiations. Although. the results of
the present study are limited by the small number
of judges employed, one cannot ignore its implications. In the opinion of variotis legal experts, the
evaluations completed by professionals other than
psychiatrists were in no way second rate. Additional data demonstrated that in actual trial situations, psychologists' opinions regarding legal insanity were adhered' to in 82 percent of the cases
when a medical expert offered opposing testimony.
These findings on a practical level have significant economic implications, since psychiatric
"time" is traditionally more expensive. The results suggest that the courts could obtain essentially the same product, and possibly a superior
one, at less cost by utilizing nonmedical experts.

pealed to the jury to disregard the witness's interpretation of a projective test:
Ladies and gentlemen, then we come to that ink
blot. . . . Fourteen responses and four of them
turned out to be anatomical things - hearts or
whatever it happened to be. Is there something
unusual about that? Is a man crazy when he sees
a heart or something else four times. .. ? After
all, they are just blots of ink. Is a man crazy
when he sees them? And how about that last
one, that rocket one. He says he sees a rocket
going off. I asked him, Doctor, was there any
rocket fired during that period of time that might
stick in a man's brain and might suggest it to
him? The doctor doesn't know, but there is
something explosive about a personality if he
sees a rocket on a little ink blot.
Well, ladies and gentlemen, there is not much I
can say about that; I am not an expert. . . . But I
can say one thing; that it is a jury decision. It is
your province. It is your function to take that
evidence and weigh that evidence and decide
whether what the doctor said as65far as you are
concerned made any sense at all.
In Jenkins, itself, in fact, a courtroom observer
pointed out that during the course of a psychologist's
testimony, the presiding trial judge "literally threw a
deck of projective cards onto the floor."66 Finally, a
Jenkins analysis concluded by asking rhetorically:
[Wlhat significance will the jury attach to the defense psychologist's testimony when confronted
with the conflicting testimony of the state's psychiatrist? Will recitation to the jury of the psychiatrist's qualifications, which will include a
medical degree, have any prejudicial effect on
the defendant who produces a psychologist?

[Emphasis added. ]67

The treatment of the problem and answers to these
questions must be dealt with openly and completely
by forensic psychologists. They must confront the
reasons why they have been treated as second-class
citizens in the court and why they sometimes see
themselves in that role.
One tool in the psychologist's arsenal may be
created by the legislatures on a state-by-state basis. I
am referring to a strong privilege statute. In this regard, Pennsylvania law is clear and explicit:
A person licensed as a psychologist under the
provisions of this act cannot, without the written
consent of his client, be examined in a civil or
criminal action as to any information acquired in
the course of his professional services in behalf
of the client. The confidential relations and
communication between a psychologist and his
client are on the same basis as those provided by
law between an attorney and client, and nothing
such
in this act shall be construed to require any
privileged communication to be disclosed. 68
In Pennsylvania, then, the psychologist's legal
status is a direct function of the strength of the psychologists' lobbying force in the statehouse, and the
second-class expert argument is inappropriate. Take,

for example, a Pittsburgh case in which a psychiatrist
had been held in contempt for refusing to release psychiatric records of a patient to the court in a juvenile
delinquency matter involving the patient's son. Although that had been the trial court's ruling, the contempt citation was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 69 on the grounds that such disclosure
70
would have violated the patient's right to privacy,
because the information in question was obtained
.'within the context of a psychotherapist-patient relationship." 7' Interestingly, this analysis was only
necessary because, in Pennsylvania, the doctorpatient privilege statute7 2- 73was not as broad as the
psychologist-client statute.
Forensic psychologists must also be concerned
with the forensic psychiatrists who are still uncomfortable about the newcomers' involvement, which is
seen in some quarters as usurpation. Thus, in the
case where the prosecution said, "After all, they are
just blots of ink," the American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief clearly labeling such forensic psychologists as '.laymen" in relation to the
diagnosis of "mental illness or defects." 7 4 According
to the eminent Professor of Law and Psychiatry
Richard Allen, the American Psychiatric Association's ultimate objective is "'quite clear: reversal of
Judge Bazelon's decision in Jenkins ."7 This spectre
must be a serious subject of consideration for the
forensic psychologist.
It is clear that organized psychiatry is choosing to
wage its war against organized psychology on many
fronts, most notably in defending against psychologists' challenge of third-party payment plans based on
"freedom of choice" grounds. 76 Although this is not
a "courtroom" issue per se, its significance should
not be understated.
Social Status a Reflection of Self-Perceptions
The genesis of the "second-class expert" attitude
cannot be laid solely, or even, perhaps, predominantly,
at the feet of the legal or psychiatric profession. This
social status can be seen as a reflection on the selfperceptions held by many psychologists of their potential courtroom role. Although it was a lawyer who
noted that the traditional limitation in courtroom participation "comes not only from the law, but also
from the inhibitions of psychologists, ' 7 7 it is clearly
very often the "fault" of the psychologists themselves that their forensic role has been so truncated.
Indeed, psychiatrist Louisell's observation some
twenty years ago that "psychologists . . . often seem
to display an undue hesitancy, amounting almost to
fear, to taking the witness stand," ' 7 8 is still all too
79
valid in many instances.
Douglas Sargent, a psychiatrist, has noted that a
forensic psychiatrist is "annoyed by the limitations
which legal procedures place on his testimony, impatient with the stilted rituals of courtroom etiquette,
intrigued by the law's archaic language." This response, he says, creates an "unfortunate polarization
of attitudes . . . [leading to] a hostile parody of the
MDLR/MAY-JUNE 1980
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truth."-8 0 The substitution of psychologist for psychiatrist in that sentence would similarly ring true.

In addition, forensic psychologists must confront
the fact that they cannot "behave in the courtroom as
though the issues were settled." 8' Transcripts sometimes reveal forensic psychological witnesses whose
demeanors in important, otherwise well-prepared,
serious criminal cases range from obstinate to condescending to patronizing to omniscient.12 In the vernacular, some forensic psychologists must "clean up
their act."
Psychologists have become aware that they must
learn how to deal with specific courtroom gambits if
they are to survive on the witness stand. 83 Thus, the
heralded Competency Screening Index, prepared
by the Laboratory of Community Psychiatry in conjunction with the National Institute of Mental Health,
establishes a sentence-completion test for the purpose
of "'quickly screening defendants" to make recommendations as to their competency to stand trial. 8 4 It
is geared to determine whether an individual defendant meets the three-pronged, common-law test for
competency (ability to cooperate with counsel, understand nature of proceedings, understand consequences of proceedings), and, in fact, may effectively
do so. 8 5 A witness, however, who administers and
then testifies to the results of a test such as this must
be aware of, and must be able to deal with, the pitfalls of probing cross-examination, a skeptical judge,
and, on occasion, an incredulous jury.
One more point must be made. Although "propsychologist" courts have generally taken the position that "the qualification of an expert has historically been a matter not of licensure, but of experience, 8 6 the whole area of licensure is now subject to
attack from consumer groups, economists and political scientists. They charge that licensing perpetuates
"the return of medieval guilds," as it "significantly
increases the cost of professional services, decreases
the supply of practitioners, inhibits improvements in
the organization and delivery of services, stifles 'innovative training programs, and is discriminatory. "87
Again, it will be necessary for thoughtful psychologists to deal with these charges.
Involvement on Three Levels
Although this picture looks gloomy, it should also
be encouraging to forensic psychologists. The cases
which I have referred to, especially the noncriminal
ones, are an opportunity for psychologists to push for
further involvement in the judicial process on at least
three separate levels.
First, the special assessment, testing and intellectual/personality evaluation skills and techniques
possessed by clinical psychologists uniquely prepare
them for much courtroom work, 88 such as in the
areas referred to earlier, as well as such newly emerging areas as ferreting out cultural test biases. 8 9 They
will better be able to play this role if they become, in
the phrase of psychologist Stanley Brodsky and psy198

MDLR/VOL. 4. NO. 3

chiatrist Ames Robey, "courtroom-oriented" and
discard their usual "courtroom-unfamiliar" pose.9
Secondly, it is clear that testimony in civil rights
class actions gives the forensic psychologist a tremendous opportunity "to contribute to social
change" 9 1 as an "advocate and facilitator,- 92 while
fulfilling his or her role as part of a "socially concerned system." 93 To further promote this socialchange model, psychologists have begun to work with
lawyers, psychiatrists and former patients on such
endeavors as the Task Force Panel on Legal and
Ethical Issues of the President's Commission on
Mental Health, 94 and they have devoted full issues of
their professional journals to the "emerging interface
between law and psychology.'" 9 Such joint participation will only expand in the future.
As a corollary to both of these reasons, it should
also be pointed out that forensic psychologists are
remarkably successful when they go to court. In 70
percent of a group of cases studied, the verdict was in
favor of the side on which the psychologists tes96
tified.
Finally, it is clear that the courts are ready for the
forensic psychologist. As indicated earlier, legal barriers to testimony have virtually disappeared. 97 One
commentator calls the clinical psychologist "worthy
of our consideration in the seeking of new and improved trial techniques." 98 Another questions how
long the law can "lag behind scientific fact and common knowledge," 99 and a third argues that the psychologist "can contribute in the courtroom toward a
better understanding of emotional illness."' 0 0 Interestingly, this final commentator points out how
psychology's struggle for acceptance as a scientific
and objective discipline familiarizes the psychologist
with ways to overcome the shortcomings of such
tools as projective tests and uniquely prepares him or
her for the rigors of cross-examination.' 0 ' It thus remains only for the psychological community to
openly confront the reasons which have perpetuated
the anticourtroom bias and to educate all participants
in the litigation process to the need for and uniqueness of appropriate psychological testimony. The recent creation of an American Board of Forensic Psychology can only aid in this educational process. 0 2
In a 1961 article, Norma Scheflen, a research psychologist at Temple University, quoted the famous
law dean John Wigmore as saying, "Whenever the
psychologist is really ready for the courts, the courts
are ready for him."' 0 3 Although 19 years ago Dr.
Scheflen prophesized that "the time is now," it is unfortunate that history did not truly bear her out.
Perhaps now, finally, it will.
N
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